To examine whether young, middle-aged, and older adults view the concept of intelligent person as similar or different during adulthood, 140 adults of various ages rated how likely it would be for individuals of average and exceptional intelligence at 30, 50, and 70 years of age to be engaged in behaviors previously identified by adults as characterizing adult intelligence. Adults perceived more similarity between exceptionally intelligent prototypes of closer ages (i.e., 30 and 50 and 50 and 70). Intelligence was perceived to consist of interest and ability to deal with novelty, everyday competence, and verbal competence-dimensions that were perceived to be differentially important for different-aged prototypes and by individuals of different ages. Participants' conceptions also included the idea that intelligence is malleable and that abilities differentially increase or decrease across the life span.
Several recent theories of adult intellectual development and aging (e.g., Baltes, 1987; Baltes, Dittmann-Kohli, & Dixon, 1984; Basseches, 1984; Berg & Sternberg, 1985b; Cavanaugh, Kramer, Sinnott, Camp, & Markley, 1985; Labouvie-Vief, 1982) raise questions regarding the nature of intelligence and its measurement during adulthood. The general issue raised by such models is well captured by Baltes et al.'s (1984) proposition that "with aging . . . domains of psychological functioning other than performance on intelligence tests gain in relative significance" (p. 50). Such a position on the nature of intelligence espoused by these new models conies, in part, from their contextual view of adult intellectual development (see Dixon, 1992 , for a review of contextual models in adult development). These contextual theories of adult intellectual development posit that intelligence consists of the mental activity involved in successfully adapting to one's environment. As the environmental contexts of older adults are less oriented toward succeeding in academia, the nature of intelligence is thought to be somewhat different during late adulthood (see also Charlesworth, 1976; Neisser, 1976) . Also included in these contextualist positions of intelligence is the notion that intellectual decline is not inevitable with adult aging, but rather that the form of intellectual change during adulthood may vary as a function of the ability This research was conducted with the support of a Yale University graduate fellowship and a Biomedical Research Support grant (S07RR07092) from the National Institutes of Health, and the writing of the article was supported by Grant HD25728 from the National Institute of Human Development and the National Institute on Aging awarded to Cynthia A. Berg. The research was also supported by Contract N0001483C0013 from the Office of Naval Research, with joint support from the Army Research Institute awarded to Robert J. Sternberg.
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in question (the notion of multidirectionality; see Baltes, 1987; Dixon, 1992) as well as experience and training (the notion of plasticity; see Baltes, 1987) .
Although theoretical statements that the nature and form of intelligence may differ across adulthood are numerous (e.g., Baltes, 1987; Berg & Sternberg, 1985b; Cavanaugh et al., 1985; Dixon & Baltes, 1986; Labouvie-Vief, 1982) , relatively little empirical work has been directed at whether lay adults across the life span perceive that the nature of intelligence differs with advancing adult age. From the contextual perspective, people's conceptions of intelligence are particularly useful as they provide somewhat of an insider's perspective to the mental activity it takes to adapt to life contexts (e.g., Berg, 1990; Berry, 1984; Sternberg, 1984) . Lay adults' conceptions of the nature of intelligence across adulthood are also important, as they serve as the basis for informal assessments of the intelligence of others and self and may impact and be predictive of current and future intellectual performances (e.g., Bandura, 1986; Brandtstadter, 1984; Lachman, 1986; Lachman & Leff, 1989) . The overall goal of the present study was to examine lay adults' conceptions of intelligence across the adult life span to investigate whether the perceived nature of intelligence differs during adulthood. More specifically, the primary goal was to examine the kinds of characteristics that underlie adults' conceptions of intelligence and whether certain characteristics of intelligence are perceived as differentially likely for certain ages and by individuals of different ages. A secondary goal was to examine, in a preliminary fashion, whether adults' beliefs regarding intelligence could be characterized by the principles of multidirectionality and plasticity.
To address the primary goal of the study, a prototype view of intelligence was adopted, as is consistent with much previous work on lay adults' conceptions of intelligence (e.g., Cornelius, Kenny, & Caspi, 1989; Fry, 1984; Mugny & Carugati, 1989; Sternberg, Conway, Ketron, & Bernstein, 1981) . This prototype view comes from Neisser's (1979) suggestion that intelligence as a concept exists only as a resemblance to a prototype of an intelligent person. That is, a person's intelligence is the degree to which the individual corresponds to his or her culture's pro-totype of an exceptionally intelligent person. Neisser (1979) called for the systematic study of the concept of intelligent person to further understand the characteristics of the prototypic intelligent person. Irvine (1970) also argued that psychologists could benefit from an examination of "the layperson's use of the word intelligence as a key to the way in which society designates acts as intelligent" (p. 24).
Although research has been conducted to examine the dimensions that underlie lay adults' (primarily young adults; Mugny & Carugati, 1989; Sternberg et al., 1981) , experts ' (Mason & Rebok, 1984; Sternberg et al., 1981) , and children's views of intelligence (Leahy & Hunt, 1983; Yussen & Kane, 1983) , almost no work has been conducted to examine adults' conceptions of intelligence across the adult life span (with the exception of Cornelius et al., 1989) . Much of the current work examining people's conceptions of intelligence does indicate that the dimensions that make up the prototypic intelligent person vary at different periods of development and for individuals of different ages or experiential backgrounds. For instance, research by Siegler and Richards (1982) and Yussen and Kane indicates that adults and children largely agree that the characteristics that constitute intelligence during child development shift from sensorimotor and language skills in infancy, academic and social skills in grade school, and social motivational and cognitive factors in young adulthood. Furthermore, Yussen and Kane found that individuals of different ages stressed different components of intelligence in late childhood and early adulthood: Adults stressed learning potential and motivation, whereas children stressed physical characteristics and how well individuals manage specific tasks. Research on adults' self-perceptions of intellectual performance is suggestive that adults perceive intelligence to shift across the life span away from a prototype of academic intelligence toward a prototype of everyday intelligence (e.g., Cornelius et al., 1989; Williams, Denney, &Schadler, 1983) .
In the present study we explored whether adults perceived the nature of intelligence to differ across adulthood, using a developmental extension of a methodology developed by Sternberg et al. (1981) to examine people's conceptions of intelligence. Adults rated how likely it would be for individuals of average intelligence and individuals of exceptional intelligence at 30, 50, and 70 years of age to be engaged in a set of behaviors that a separate group of adults perceived as characteristic of exceptionally intelligent individuals of various adult ages. Comparisons of the different-aged prototypes were conducted to address whether prototypes of intelligent persons differed at a global level and, more specifically, whether certain dimensions were perceived as more likely for certain-aged prototypes and by individuals of specific ages.
A secondary goal was to examine, in a preliminary fashion, whether adults' beliefs regarding intelligence could be characterized by the principles of multidirectionality and plasticity. Children's beliefs regarding intelligence have been examined for multidirectionality and plasticity by Dweck and colleagues (Dweck & Elliott, 1983; Dweck & Leggett, 1988) . They found that children during the elementary school years shift from a belief that intelligence is malleable and can be increased to a belief that intelligence is not malleable. Dweck and Leggett found that these two beliefs relate to different goals in achievement situations. Although adults' beliefs regarding the multidirectionality and plasticity of intelligence have not explicitly been examined, beliefs regarding person-descriptive adjectives that include personality, social, and intellectual dimensions (Heckhausen, Dixon, & Bakes, 1989; Ryff, 1991) are characterized by multidirectionality. Adults' views regarding the multidirectionality and plasticity of intelligence are important as such views could contribute, in part, to the course of individual intellectual development. More specifically, in the tradition of Bandura (1986) expectations regarding the decline of a specific ability might lead to performance decrements for that ability (Lachman, 1986) .
To examine adults' beliefs regarding the multidirectionality of intelligence, adults were asked questions regarding whether intellectual abilities could decline or increase across the adult life span. Adults' beliefs regarding the plasticity or modifiability of intelligence were examined through questions regarding whether one's intelligence could increase or decrease across the life span and the usefulness of training.
Method

Construction of a List of Intelligent Behaviors
A group of 152 individuals from the greater New Haven, Connecticut, area generated intelligent and unintelligent behaviors to be used as the basis for constructing a list of behaviors that adults perceived to be most characteristic of intelligent and unintelligent adults of a variety of adult ages. Individuals were contacted either by telephone, through a random selection of the greater New Haven area telephone listings (n = 115, response rate of 38%), or by mail, primarily residents of an apartment complex in the New Haven area (n = 37, response rate of 11%). Participants ranged in age from 17 to 83 and were divided into three age groups: a young group (n = 47, mean age = 29.8, range = 20-39), a middle-aged group (n = 50, mean age = 49.4, range = 40-59), and an older group (« = 44, mean age = 68.3, range = 60-83). The mean educational level of the subjects was 14.3 years (SD =2.7 years, range = 8-20 years). Eleven individuals ranging in age from 17 to 21, who were students in high school or college, were excluded from the behavior compilation, as previous research (Sternberg et al., 1981) suggested that students' conceptions of intelligence differed substantially from nonstudents' conceptions.
Individuals were asked to list as many behaviors as they could that characterized an exceptionally intelligent individual and an exceptionally unintelligent individual at only one of three ages (i.e., at either 30, 50, or 70 years of age). This division of intelligent individuals at 30,50, and 70 years of age was meant to represent young, middle-aged, and older adulthood, respectively, and is consistent with other theorists' demarcations of adulthood (e.g., Havighurst, 1972) as well as with people's own chronological divisions of the life span (e.g., Neugarten, 1968) . Approximately equal numbers of individuals in the three age groups listed behaviors for the exceptionally intelligent and exceptionally unintelligent individuals at the three ages.
Behaviors elicited through the mail or by telephone were combined and compiled into a master list by collapsing over the age of the individual being characterized (e.g., 30,50, or 70 years of age) and over the age group of the individuals listing the behaviors (younger, middle-aged, and older group), separately for the intelligent and unintelligent individuals. Behaviors were included if they were listed by at least 2 individuals at any age of intelligent prototype, with clear instances of redundancies eliminated. This procedure resulted in 130 intelligent behaviors and 120 unintelligent behaviors. The number of unintelligent behaviors was reduced to 66 using ratings by three individuals (aged 28, 55, and 70) of how important the behaviors were in denning unintelligent individuals, in general.
Eighteen behaviors were added to the list of intelligent behaviors that various theories of intelligence would posit to be important in the assessment of intelligence, if the behaviors were not already on the master list. Examples of such behaviors were the following: "is able to monitor one's solution to a problem," from Berg and Sternberg's (1985b) theory; "displays abstract thought," from Cattell (1971) and Horn's (1970) theory; and "is able to use words speedily and easily," from Thurstone's (1938) theory. These behaviors were added because many typical problem-solving abilities were mentioned only once. If these behaviors were of low frequency because of their perceived unimportance in denning individuals of exceptional intelligence, then the added behaviors would be eliminated in subsequent ratings (in fact, 10 of these 18 behaviors made it into the final list of intelligent behaviors).
Because 214 behaviors provided an unmanageable number of items, for the purposes of this study, the number of items was reduced by having a separate group of 23 subjects rate behaviors on a 9-point rating scale from high (9) to low (1) as to their importance in identifying exceptionally intelligent and exceptionally unintelligent individuals who were 30,50, and 70 years of age. This separate group of raters was recruited from membership lists of churches in the New Haven area and ranged in age from 24 to 84. Individuals were asked to complete six different questionnaires constructed by crossing age of individual being rated (i.e., 30-, 50-, and 70-year-old) with type of individual (i.e., intelligent or unintelligent). Intelligent behaviors were rated only with respect to the intelligent individuals, and unintelligent behaviors were rated only with respect to the unintelligent individuals.
Items retained for the present study consisted of the 55 intelligent behaviors from this additional set of ratings that received the largest mean importance ratings for either the 30-, 50-, or 70-year-old intelligent individual (i.e., received a mean rating of over 7.3 on a 9-point scale) and the 14 unintelligent behaviors that received the largest mean importance ratings for either the 30-, 50-, or 70-year-old unintelligent individual (i.e., received a mean rating of over 6.8 on a 9-point scale). The method of compilation of behaviors was chosen so that certain behaviors that were deemed important for one period of the life span would be included in the analyses, even though the behaviors may not have been deemed important at the other age levels.
The decision as to the number of intelligent and unintelligent behaviors to retain was made on the basis of three criteria: (a) to keep the total number of behaviors below approximately 80 behaviors, (b) to include more intelligent behaviors than unintelligent behaviors, and (c) to choose those behaviors of highest importance in people's ratings of exceptionally intelligent and unintelligent individuals. We should note that unintelligent behaviors were included in the study, in part, to present foils that would encourage subjects to think carefully about their ratings. As the unintelligent behaviors were not central to the purpose of the study, they were not further analyzed.
Subjects
A total of 140 adults between the ages of 22 and 85 were drawn from membership lists of large Protestant churches in the New Haven (n = 69) and Salt Lake City areas (n = 71).' For procedural purposes, participants were divided into three age groups: young adults between the ages of 22 and 40 (n = 47,15 men and 32 women, M= 32.6), middleaged adults between the ages of 41 and 59 (ft = 43, 17 men and 26 women, M= 49.1), and older adults between the ages of 60 and 85 (n -48,18 men and 30 women, M = 68.4). The three age groups did not differ in mean educational level (M = 15.4 years, SD = 1.4, range = 10-22). Two women from the middle-aged group were dropped because of missing answers for one page of the rating questionnaire.
Procedure
Participants rated each list of intelligent behaviors on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 tyery unlikely) to 9 (very likely) in terms of how likely it was for individuals of average and exceptional intelligence to be engaged in each behavior. Ratings of average and exceptionally intelligent individuals were gathered to encourage participants to provide ratings that reflected how the behaviors distinguished between individuals of average and exceptional intelligence, rather than simply to provide high ratings for the exceptionally intelligent individuals. As the focus of the study was on conceptions of intelligence, however, analyses of the ratings of individuals of average intelligence were not performed. Participants rated each list of intelligent behaviors three times. The three ratings dealt with the likelihoods that individuals of exceptional and average intelligence of 30, 50, and 70 years of age would be engaged in the behaviors. All lists of intelligent behaviors contained the same 55 intelligent and 14 unintelligent behaviors. The order in which the behaviors were presented in each list was randomized across subjects. Within each list, the order in which individuals of average and exceptional intelligence were rated was counterbalanced across participants, but blocked within participant. The order of the age of the prototypes for which the list of intelligent behaviors was rated was counterbalanced across participants.
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Six subjects neglected to rate a total of from one to five behaviors on the three lists of intelligent behaviors. These behaviors were typically located at the top or bottom of the page and may have been overlooked. Missing ratings were replaced with the mean rating supplied by the subject for the relevant age-specific list.
After participants completed the three ratings of the list of intelligent behaviors, they completed a questionnaire designed to address the following issues: the multidirectionality of intelligence, the plasticity or mod inability of one's intelligence, hereditary versus environmental influences on intelligence, explicit definitions of intelligence, depictions of the most intelligent and unintelligent individuals that subjects knew, and familiarity with average and exceptionally intelligent individuals at each of the three ages. Adults' views regarding the multidirectionality of intelligence were tapped by two questions: (a) "Are there certain intellectual abilities that you feel show a decline with increasing adult age? (If yes, please list three such intellectual abilities.)" (b) "Are there certain intellectual abilities that you feel improve with increasing adult age? (If yes, please list three such intellectual abilities.)" Adults' views regarding the modifiability or plasticity of intelligence were tapped by three questions: (a) "Do you think that individuals can become less intelligent with time? (If yes, list possible ways that one can become less intelligent.)" (b) "Do you think that individuals can become more intelligent with time? (If yes, list possible ways that one can become more intelligent.)" (c) "Can the performance of individuals on intelligence tests be improved through practice and training?"
Results
Prototypes of Intelligence During Adulthood
To examine whether adults perceived differences in the characteristics that constitute intelligent 30-, 50-, and 70-year-old individuals, two kinds of analyses were conducted. First, global differences in the prototypes of exceptional intelligence were examined, and second, analyses were conducted to localize the types of dimensions that differentiated prototypes of exceptional intelligence at different ages. Internal consistency reliabilities (coefficient alphas) calculated on likelihood ratings for the exceptionally intelligent prototypes indicated high internal consistency for the ratings of the exceptionally intelligent 30-year-old (a = .964), 50-year-old (pt = .970), and 70-year-old prototypes (a = .970). (See Appendix for the means and standard deviations of the likelihood ratings of the exceptionally intelligent prototypes for each behavior.)
Global comparisons of exceptionally intelligent 30-, 50-, and 70-year-old prototypes . To examine at a global level whether prototypes of exceptionally intelligent 30-50-, and 70-year-old individuals were different, three analyses were conducted. First, mean ratings for each intelligent behavior across individuals by age of exceptionally intelligent prototype were calculated and intercorrelated. The correlations among the profiles of exceptionally intelligent prototypes were as follows: r= .802, p < .01, between ratings for the 30-and 50-year-old prototypes; r = .589, p < .01, between ratings for the 50-and 70-year-old prototypes; and r = .158, p > .05, between ratings for the 30-and 70-year-old prototypes. All correlations were significantly different from each other using Fisher's z transformation (see Cohen & Cohen, 1975) .
Second, intercorrelations of individual participants' profiles of items for the exceptionally intelligent prototypes across the three target ages were calculated. These correlations were submitted to a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with age of participants and gender as between-subjects variables and the age of prototype comparisons (three comparisons between prototypes: 30 and 50,50 and 70, and 30 and 70) as the within-subject variable. Age of prototype comparison was the only significant effect, F(2, 254) = 49.41 (MS, = .030, p < .01). Schefie's multiple comparison test revealed significant differences among all three comparisons, with individuals viewing 30-and 50-year-old prototypes as most similar (mean r = .331), 50-and 70-year-old prototypes next most similar (r = .263), and 30-and 70-year-old prototypes as least similar (r = .128).
Third, we examined the differences between prototypes by taking the squared differences between two exceptionally intelligent prototypes on each intelligent item rated and summing these differences across the intelligent items separately for each participant. This measure is similar to a measure used by Niedenthal, Cantor, and Kihlstrom (1985) to compare prototypes. These prototype difference scores were analyzed using a repeated measures ANOVA with age of participant (young, middle-aged, and older subjects) and gender as between-subjects variables and age of prototype comparisons as the within-subject variable. A significant effect of age-of-prototype comparisons was found, F(2,264) = 42.3 (MS, = 3736, p < .01), indicating again differences between the different-aged prototypes. In sum, these three analyses yielded a very consistent picture of the perceived global similarity of the prototypes of exceptionally intelligent 30-, 50-, and 70-year-old individuals. Individuals perceived the most similarity in intelligence between 30-and 50-year-old prototypes and the least amount of similarity between 30-and 70-year-old prototypes. These global differences among prototypes did not differ by gender or by the age of the participants.
Dimensions underlying peoples conceptions of intelligence throughout the adult life span. To further examine perceived differences among the prototypes of intelligence during adulthood, analyses were conducted to uncover the dimensions that adults perceived to constitute intelligence. The ratings of the likelihood that individuals of exceptional intelligence would be engaged in a given behavior were factor analyzed. As the same subjects rated these same behaviors for the prototype of exceptional intelligence at 30, 50, and 70 years of age, an extended data matrix was analyzed as recommended by Gorsuch (1983) . This involved factor analyzing a data matrix that resulted from appending the data from the 50-and 70-year-old prototypes onto the data from the 30-year-old prototype. Such an analysis allows for factor comparisons among the 30-, 50-, and 70-yearold prototypes by either separately factoring each aged prototype or by computing factor scores for individuals and comparing factor scores on the different-aged prototypes. Comparing factor scores was chosen as the method of comparison, as factor solutions on the basis of each prototype would have been conducted on an inadequate ratio of subjects to variables.
A principal-component factor analysis was conducted using a varimax rotation of the factorial axes 3 and revealed that six factors had eigenvalues greater than 1 and accounted for 58% of the variance in the data. Three interpretable factors were retained, according to Cattell's (1966) scree test, as they were the only factors that had eigenvalues greater than 2, and additional factors did not result in an appreciable gain in the total variance explained. These three factors accounted for 19.7%, 15.8%, and 15.6% of the variance in the data, fora total of 51.1%.
Behaviors with loadings of .60 and above are listed in Table 1 and were primarily used to interpret the factors, as they were most strongly correlated with the factojrs. The first factor was labeled Interest and Ability to Deal With Novelty (see Berg & Sternberg, 1985a) , as it was loaded highly by behaviors such as "is able to analyze topics in new and original ways," "is interested in gaining knowledge and learning new things," "is openminded to new ideas and trends," and "is able to learn and reason with new kinds of concepts." The second factor was labeled Everyday Competence, as it was loaded highly by behav-iors that represent an individual s adaptation to their everyday life contexts: "displays good common sense," "acts in a mature manner," "acts responsibly," and "adjusts to life situations." The third factor was labeled Verbal Competence, as it was loaded highly by behaviors such as "displays the knowledge to speak intelligently" "displays good vocabulary," and "is verbally fluent."
To examine whether the global differences found in the previous analyses between the exceptionally intelligent 30-, 50-, and 70-year-old prototypes could be localized on these three factors, factor scores were computed for each of the 138 subjects for each of the three ages of prototypes rated (Gorsuch, 1983) . Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations of these factor scores by age of prototype, age of participant, and factor of intelligence. These factor scores then served as dependent measures in a repeated measures ANOVA with age and gender of participant as between-subjects variables and age of prototype and factor of intelligence as within-subject variables. Interactions were interpreted by analyses of simple effects and Newman-Keuls tests.
A significant effect of age of prototype was found, F(2, 264) = 34.0 (MS, = .256, p < .01), indicating that overall factor scores were lower for the 70-year-old prototype than the 30-or 50-year-old prototype. A significant Age of Prototype X Factor of Intelligence interaction was found, F(4, 528) = 81.7 (MS. = .453, p < .01), indicating that although the effect of age of prototype was significant for all factors of intelligence, the direction of the effects was different. The factor of Interest and Ability to Deal With Novelty was perceived as most likely for the 30-year-old prototype (.68), next most likely for the 50-yearold prototype (.12), and least likely for the 70-year-old prototype (-.80; here all comparisons were significantly different from each other). The factor of Everyday Competence was perceived as least likely for the 30-year-old prototype (-.31) and equally likely for the 50-and 70-year-old prototypes (.06 and .25, respectively; significant differences were between 30-yearold and other prototypes). The factor of Verbal Competence was perceived as most likely for the 50-year-old (.15) and 70-year-old (.03) prototypes and less likely for the 30-year-old prototype (-.17; only differences between 30-and 50-year-old prototypes were significantly different). A significant Age of Prototype X Factor of Intelligence X Age of Participants interaction was found, F(8, 528) = 2.68, MS, = .453, p < .01. Although in general, different-aged participants viewed the dimensions of intelligence similarly for the different-aged prototypes, young individuals viewed Interest and Ability to Deal With Novelty as much less likely for the 70-year-old prototype than did the other age groups. In addition, older individuals viewed Everyday Competence more likely for the 30-year-old prototype than did the other age groups.
Educational level and perceived likelihood of dimensions of adult intelligence. We examined the relation between educa- In sum, the results of the factor analysis revealed that adults perceived intelligence during adulthood as consisting of dimensions such as Interest and Ability to Deal With Novelty, Everyday Competence, and Verbal Competence. Using these factors to further investigate differences among 30-, 50-, and 70-year-old prototypes, adults perceived certain factors to be more likely for certain-aged prototypes and by different-aged participants.
Conceptions of the Multidirectionality and Modifiability of Intelligence
To examine adults' beliefs regarding the multidirectionality and plasticity of intelligence, participants were asked to provide yes and no answers to questions designed to tap multidirectionality and modifiability, or plasticity, of intelligence and to provide justifications for or examples of their answers. Not all subjects completed these questions because of time limitations, and thus the data here are reported as percentages (between 124 and 128 individuals completed the questions reported next). Chi-square analyses revealed no age or gender differences in participants' responses to these questions.
Adults' beliefs regarding the multidirectionality of intelligence were assessed by questions related to whether certain abilities demonstrated decline or increase across the adult life span and by questions regarding the nature of such abilities. Seventy-seven percent of the participants believed that certain intellectual abilities improved with increasing age, with reasoning (7.3%), problem solving (6.9%), the ability to use past experiences advantageously (6.9%), understanding others (6.4%), and knowledge (5.9%) most frequently mentioned. Sixty-three percent believed that certain intellectual abilities declined with increasing age, with memory (29%) overwhelmingly mentioned as such an ability. The proportion of individuals viewing intelligence as truly multidirectional (i.e., abilities could both increase and decrease) was examined by crossing the question of increase with the question of decrease. The largest percentage of individuals (51.6%) believed that intelligence is multidirectional, in that abilities could both increase and decrease. However, 37.9% of individuals held a unidirectional view of intelligence, with the majority of those (68%) believing that abilities did not decline, but did increase.
Adults' beliefs regarding the concept of plasticity and modifiability of adult intelligence were assessed through questions dealing with whether individuals could become more or less intelligent with time and the reasons for such modifiability as well as through a question addressing the value of training in modifying adult intelligence. Ninety-two percent believed that individuals can become more intelligent with time, with the most frequently mentioned means of becoming more intelligent being through reading (16.5%), education (15%), life experiences (8.1%) and contact with other stimulating people (7.7%). Eighty-two percent believed that individuals can become less intelligent with time, with illness (11 %), lack of a mentally stimulating environment (9.6%), and lack of interest in learning (6.4%) most frequently mentioned as the means by which someone becomes less intelligent. The vast majority of individuals (78%) believed that intelligence could both increase and decrease throughout the adult life span. A very small minority of adults (3.8%) believed that intelligence is fixed, neither increasing nor decreasing.
Beliefs regarding the value of training for improving intellectual performance revealed that 93% of participants thought that the performance of individuals on intelligence tests could be improved through practice and training.
In sum, adults' conceptions of intelligence were largely consistent with the principles of multidirectionality and plasticity, or modifiability, of intelligence across the life span. The principle of multidirectionality of intelligence was not as widely held as was the principle of modifiability of intelligence.
Discussion
Differences in the Prototypic "Exceptionally Intelligent Person" at 30, 50, and 70 Years of Age
Adults' conceptions of exceptionally intelligent 30-, 50-, and 70-year-old individuals did differ at a global level such that they perceived the most similarity between exceptionally intelligent prototypes at 30 and 50 years of age and the least similarity between prototypes at 30 and 70 years of age. The dimensions that adults perceived to characterize intelligence during adulthood consisted of Interest and Ability to Deal With Novelty, Everyday Competence, and Verbal Competence. Using these dimensions to localize the global differences among the prototypes, adults perceived certain dimensions to be differentially likely for the exceptionally intelligent prototype at 30,50, and 70 years of age: (a) The dimension of Interest and Ability to Deal With Novelty was perceived to be most likely for the 30-year-old prototype and decreased in perceived likelihood with age of prototype, (b) The dimension of Everyday Competence was perceived to be more likely for the 50-and 70-year-old prototypes than the 30-year-old prototype, (c) The dimension of Verbal Competence was perceived to be more likely for the 50-and 70-year-old prototypes than the 30-year-old prototype. Although in general, different-aged participants viewed the likelihood of dimensions of intelligence similarly for the different-aged prototypes, young individuals perceived greater decline in likelihood of Interest and Ability to Deal With Novelty with age than did the other age groups, and older adults viewed Everyday Competence as more likely for the 30-year-old prototype than did the other age groups.
The differences among prototypes of intelligence across adulthood is consistent with the work of Siegler and Richards (1982) and Yussen and Kane (1983) reviewed earlier, which found differences in children and young adults' conceptions of intelligence during childhood. The greater perceived similarity between prototypes of closer ages and the agreement in similarity across individuals of different ages may reflect consensually held beliefs regarding age norms (e.g., Neugarten, Moore, & Lowe, 1965) for young, middle-aged and older adulthood. One component of these norms may be the developmental life tasks (e.g., Havighurst, 1972 ) that adults must master and the perceived overlap of these life tasks for closer aged prototypes.
We should note that the dimensions underlying adults' conceptions of intelligence uncovered in the study are consistent with other studies of adults' conceptions of intelligence, in that components of problem solving and everyday competence were present (e.g., Cornelius et al, 1989; Mugny & Carugati, 1989; Sternberg et al., 1981) . There is also some overlap between these dimensions of intelligence and the dimensions that theorists posit to underlie adult intelligence, such as Cattell (1971) and Horn's (1970) fluid and crystallized intelligence, Baltes et al.'s (1984) mechanics versus pragmatics of intelligence, Sternberg's componential versus knowledge acquisition subtheory (Berg & Sternberg, 1985b; Sternberg, 1985) , and everyday problem-solving abilities (e.g., Baltes et al., 1984; Cavanaugh et al, 1985; Cornelius & Caspi, 1987; Poon, Rubin, & Wilson, 1989; Sinnott, 1989; Sternberg & Wagner, 1986) . Certain dimensions of adults' conceptions of intelligence were not as well represented in current theories of adult intellectual development. For instance, behaviors that loaded highest on the factor of Interest in and Ability to Deal With Novelty (e.g, "is interested in gaining knowledge and learning new things" and "is open-minded to new ideas and trends") are not captured by current theories of intelligence. However, such behaviors are represented in some measures and theories of personality and have been found to be predictive of longitudinal gains in intellectual functioning (e.g, Eichorn, Hunt, & Honzik, 1981; Schooler, 1987) .
The differential likelihood given to dimensions of intelligence for the 30-, 50-, and 70-year-old prototypes is consistent with empirical work on the developmental trajectories of measured and perceived performance across the adult life span for similar abilities. For instance, the decreased likelihood with age of prototype given to the factor of Interest and Ability to Deal With Novelty is consistent with the decline in measured performance on tests of fluid intelligence (see Horn, 1970 , for a review). The increased likelihood of Everyday Competence for 50-and 70-year-old prototypes is compatible with some research indicating increased performance on measures of everyday problem solving during middle-aged and later adulthood (e.g, Cornelius & Caspi, 1987) , but not with other work (e.g, Denney, 1989) .
The decline in perceived likelihood of Interest and Ability to Deal With Novelty and increase in perceived likelihood of Everyday Competence is also compatible with research by Berg (1990) , which found that adults perceived decline in their fluid intellectual abilities and stability in their crystallized and everyday problem-solving abilities with age (see also Vella, Fingerman, Adams-Price, Faulkner, & Perlmutter, 1990) . Cornelius et al. (1989) also found that adults' perceived resemblance to a prototype of academic intelligence declines with age, whereas resemblance to a prototype of practical intelligence increases with age. Further research is needed to determine whether the perceived likelihood of certain dimensions of intelligence corresponds to the perceived maintenance or decline of abilities over the life span.
The perceived likelihood of the dimensions of intelligence across age of prototypes is also consistent with current contextual theories of intelligence reviewed earlier (e.g, Baltes et al, 1984; Berg & Sternberg, 1985b; Cavanaugh et al, 1985) , which tie the meaning of intelligence to the specific contextual or environmental demands placed on the individual. That is, the intellectual demands of older adults consist largely of dealing with cognitive tasks that are outside of the academic environment, and as a result more traditional measures of intellectual functioning (e.g, fluid intelligence or dealing with novelty) should become less important, whereas measures of adaptation to the everyday environment (e.g, everyday competence) should become more important. Future empirical investigations of the relation between such dimensions and criteria of successful adaptation to one's context are needed to determine the usefulness of adults' conceptions for explicit theories and measurements of intelligence.
Beliefs Regarding the Multidirectionality and Plasticity of Intelligence
In general, adults held beliefs about intelligence that were consistent with the principles of multidirectionality and plastic-ity of intelligence. Overall, a large amount of consensus was found among adults of a variety of ages in their beliefs regarding multidirectionality and plasticity, as no age differences were found in adherence to these beliefs. Similar consensus among adults regarding beliefs of the multidirectionality of a variety of person adjectives was found by Heckhausen et al. (1989) .
Not all individuals adhered to the view that intellectual abilities are multidirectional. Over a third of the subjects believed that intellectual abilities were unidirectional, with the majority of those viewing intellectual abilities as increasing, but not decreasing. This is somewhat surprising given the literature on attitudes and stereotypes toward the elderly (see Kite & Johnson, 1988 , for a review). Future research is needed to determine if such individual differences could be predicted by one's measured intellectual level and the impact these differences in beliefs have for the future direction of individual intellectual change (Lachman & Leff, 1989) .
The vast majority of adults believed that intelligence is modifiable throughout the life span, both in terms of increases and decreases. Only 3.8% of adults held the belief that intelligence is fixed, neither increasing nor decreasing. The proportion of adults viewing intelligence as fixed was much smaller than Dweck and colleagues found in their work with children; Leggett (as cited in Dweck & Leggett, 1988) found that one third of her junior high school sample believed that intelligence was not malleable. This discrepancy may be due to the fact that Dweck and colleagues assessed plasticity or modifiability of intelligence in only one direction, namely, that of increase, and did not assess children's beliefs regarding decreases in intelligence. The mechanisms adults offered for how individuals can become more or less intelligent overlap with mechanisms advanced by other theorists (e.g., exercise or lack of exercise hypothesis of Denney, 1984 , complexity and stimulation of environment by Schooler, 1987) , but also suggest other mechanisms for contextual theorists to explore (e.g., reading, social environment, and drive and ambition). Finally, adults' beliefs regarding the value of training and practice in improving one's intelligence are consistent with a large body of research demonstrating impressive plasticity in intelligence (e.g., Baltes & Willis, 1982; Kliegl, Smith, & Baltes, 1989; Schaie & Willis, 1986) .
We must acknowledge some limitations and qualifications of the current study. First, the cross-sectional design of the study confounds age and cohort effects (Schaie, 1965) . Thus, adults' conceptions of intelligence uncovered in the present study are not necessarily tied to age as inevitable ontogenetic change, but are certainly confounded with cohort-related variables. In addition, adults' conceptions of intelligence may be tied to this particular point in history and may not extend to another time in history. Second, the results were certainly influenced by the types of participants used in the study (i.e., largely White and middle class) as well as the method of uncovering adults' conceptions of intelligence. As this was a first attempt to examine adults' conceptions of intelligence across the life span, clearly other methodologies need to be used to understand adults' beliefs of the nature, multidirectionality, and plasticity of intelligence.
To conclude, adults' conceptions of intelligence across the adult life span indicate that adults perceive differences in what constitutes exceptional intelligence during young, middle, and late adulthood. These differences have implications for the sorts of informal assessments of intelligence that adults make in their everyday lives (e.g., personnel interviews and decisions regarding functioning of an older adult such as spouse or older parent) as well as the sorts of assessments they make in laboratory settings (e.g., on self-efficacy measures of intelligence). In addition, adults' conceptions of intelligence are characterized by multidirectionality and modifiability. The conceptions of intelligence uncovered in the present study are quite consistent with the ideas that contextual theorists hold about intelligence and extend these ideas in very important ways. Adults' conceptions are useful in suggesting potential dimensions of intelligence that are in need of examination to understand intelligence as adaptation. In addition, individual differences in such conceptions may be informative, as they impact the individual's current and future intellectual performances. 
